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Introduction
In modern theories of society democratization researchers clearly single out 
two conflicting concepts. The radical concept perceives aim in democracy; the 
essential concept considers existing democracies as the way which will lead the 
countries to democracy only when they create the minimal criteria for a legal state. 
In the radical concept the reality is believed to be only “democratization”, thus 
the authors insist on the subsequent development of consolidated democracy.1 
The moderate approach to the democratic theory considers consolidation of 
democracy as a sufficient precondition for the following stable development.
The development of democratic process in the Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEE) introduced new elements in the theoretical researches. 
The elements of the civil “non-state” or even “anti-state” democratization took the 
leading places in the political elites’, authoritative functionaries’ and researchers’ 
discussions during the system change. Though, the theory of the civil society, as 
K. von Beyme believes, appears to be rather ideology-driven and remote from 
life,2 but it had great influence on the people’s attitude towards the mediate 
1 W. SCHMALZ-BRUNS, Reflexive Demokratie, Baden-Baden 1995, p. 41.
2 K. VON BEYME, Ansätze zu einer Theorie der Transformation der ex-sozialistischen 
Länder Osteuropas, in: W. MERKEL (Hrsg.), Systemwechsel. 1. Theorien, Ansätze und 
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institutions, such as interest groups and parties, and contributed to the fact 
that during the transformational process in the CEE countries after1989 they 
played another role than during the previous waves of democratization, which 
ended with the system change.
Three phases of the third democratization wave (liberalization, 
democratization itself and consolidation) mentioned by S. Huntington in 19913 
are difficult to be applied to the CEE countries. Therefore, in Czechoslovakia 
and the GDR, where the collapse of the real socialism took place, the 
liberalization phase was missed. The same could be seen in Bulgaria, Romania, 
Albania, Yugoslavia, i.e. in those countries where the heredity of the partly 
changed communist ruling party was kept. In those two types of transformation 
the powerful opposition was absent. Besides, the ruling parties in the CEE 
countries weakened it by manipulating the elections results, introducing a low 
barrier for new party registration and adhering to the “divide and rule” policy.
The retrospective analysis shows that the democratization phase looks 
rather compressed. Implicitly, it is believed to be ended with the creation of the 
most important institutions (multi-party system, free and democratic elections, 
parliament, president, division of branches of government), and especially 
with the adoption of the Constitution. But after the establishment of the basic 
institutions in CEE, the electoral systems were often viewed as auxiliary and 
disposed to the necessary changes for achieving the goals of the leading groups.4
Having defined the aim of the paper as the study of democracy 
consolidation in CEE by the analysis of the transitional post-communist 
societies, let’s focus our attention on the phase of democratization. It should 
be mentioned, that even a short phase of democratization (before the adoption 
of the constitution) allows marking out three institutional aspects, which 
played an important role for transitional societies. These are strengthening of 
Konzeptionen, Opladen 1996, p. 142.
3 S. P. HUNTINGTON, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 
University of Oklahoma Press 1991, pp. 46–51.
4 M. KASAPOVIC – D. NOHLEN, Wahlsysteme und Systemwechsel in Osteuropa, in: W. 
Merkel (Hrsg.), Systemwechsel. 1. Theorien, Ansätze und Konzeptionen, Opladen 1996, p. 47.
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the national borders, choosing the form of the government and the electoral 
system. In general, these institutional changes became crucial factors in 
democratization development of the post-communist societies, so let’s 
examine each of them.
Institutional Aspects of Transitional Societies
Analyzing the first institutional aspect of transitional societies, namely 
strengthening of the national borders, it should mentioned that another wave 
of democratization started in 1989 and differed from the previous ones by 
escalation of the nationalistic problems and tendencies to irredentism. In the 
1990s only 5 out of 19 CEE countries had the same borders as the previous 
national states (Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and Hungary). Other 
countries are unconsolidated products of disintegration of three federations 
(the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia). At first among three federations 
only Czechoslovakia the least resembled the country, which could be 
disintegrated. The scenario of its disintegration was discussed involuntarily. 
During the conflict period of disintegration Czechoslovakia could have used 
the Belgian example of federation formation. The subcultural isolation of 
two national groups in Czechoslovakia was considerably less, than it was in 
Belgium between Flemings and Walloon. But the readiness to divide the rich 
parts of the country was implemented too. The maintenance of federation in 
Czechoslovakia failed due to the lack of cooperation between the elites at level 
of general institutions and inability to create the general Czechoslovakian party 
system.5 Unlike poorer Montenegro in former Yugoslavia, Slovakia, being less 
socially and economically developed, did not demonstrate “federal devotion”, 
which could have ensured state and territorial integration of Czechoslovakia.
The intellectual community of all CEE federations condemned 
“imperialism” of the centre, but “social imperialism”, which presupposed the 
5 W. MERKEL, Institutionalisierung und Konsolidierung der Demokratien in Ostmitteleuropa, 
in: W. MERKEL – E. SANDSCHNEIDER – D. SEGERT (Hrsg.), Systemwechsel. 2. Die 
Institutionalisierung der Demokratie, Opladen 1996, p. 100.
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sacrifice of the centre in favor of regions, was not ignored by the community. 
The desires and hopes of European integration, contributed to the fact that Slovakia 
became more focused on secession, than earlier. K. von Beyme states, that the 
unification of “hereditary statehood and ethnical consciousness” is a crucial factor 
of the organizing force of nationalism.6 In some countries from Poland to Croatia, 
the ethnical minorities in the period of democratization had at least minimal 
parliamentary representation. And in other countries, as it is highlighted by V. 
I. Burdiak, the minorities are concentrated in some territories, in particular the 
Hungarians in Romania, have distanced themselves from politics, not to excite 
Romanian nationalism. The scholar mentions the same about the Hungarians in 
Slovakia, who mainly take a critical view of the political system of the Slovak 
Republic. Only in Bulgaria the ethnical Turks’ party, the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms, managed to attain the position of an indispensable partner in coalition 
formation, as the small amount of parties is elected to the parliament and the 
choice of possible coalition alternatives is limited.7
National construction in former federations (the Czechoslovakia, the 
USSR, Yugoslavia) is carrying on, and that is why it is worth approaching 
the implementation of borrowed forms of democracy rather carefully, as its 
institutions cannot be adapted in every country. It is necessary to consider 
such factor of the theory of transformation as the possibility of war between 
democracies. Countries in other regions of the world demonstrate greater 
inclination to war, than “mature democracies” or stable autocracies.8 In 
places, where governments are “partly liberal” and delegate’s democracies of 
charismatic presidents have not implemented the norms of the “world union”, 
it is not enough for consolidation of democracy just to ascertain that in the 
political system there is no alternative of democratic rules of the game.
6 Von BEYME, p. 144.
7 V. I. BURDIAK, The Republic of Bulgaria at the Turn of the Epochs: Political Transformation 
of Society, Chernivtsi 2004, pp. 244–245.
8 E. MANSFIELD – J. SNYDE, Democratization and the Danger of War, in: International 
Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1995, pp. 5–6; S. P. HUNTINGTON, Democracy for the Long Haul, 
in: Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1996, p. 6.
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Studying the second institutional aspect of transitional societies, namely 
the choice of government system (presidential, parliamentary or mixed) 
conducted by the CEE countries, it should be mentioned that the direct 
spreading of western institutions played the secondary role. Its choice chiefly 
depended upon the course of transformation. Thus, taking into consideration 
the pact variant in Hungary, where the balance allowed some minor steps in the 
constitutional process, it led neither to the presidential and parliamentary system, 
nor to the weaker variant of the premier and presidential system, where Croatia, 
Lithuania, Poland and even Romania can be referred, taking into account that 
the division of branches of government was rather formal here.9
In the countries where the old collective government was gradually 
supplanted by the sole head of the country, the presidential systems have 
been formed, especially in case of charismatic leader. In Poland it was 
revealed through numerous conflicts even under the pact variant of changes. 
The peculiarity of Poland showed itself through the leading role of the 
President, during the rule of V. Yaruzelskii. In some countries after the 
transitional non-presidential period, as in Belarus, a poorly masked form of 
presidential dictatorship has been formed. In countries with a mixed form 
of the presidential and parliamentary systems, the division of branches of 
government according to the constitutions is nearly absent. For instance, in 
Russia the form of government was rather parliamentary, than it had been seen 
under President B. Yeltsyn. To our mind, any president can shift the balance 
in his/her favour, due to the fact that parties do not play any important role in 
the country. Charismatic leaders actively use the mixed system of government 
to strengthen their power. Thus, in Romania and Bulgaria (till 1991), when the 
transformation was started by the communist high-ranking functionaries, and 
the representatives of the old regime cadre became presidents, there was no 
need in the charismatic leader.
The best way out for the Czechoslovakia, where, as a result of the 
former regime failure, a new group of civilian forces came to power, was 
9 MERKEL, p. 79.
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the parliamentary system, as it lowers the concentration of the previous 
authority, who acted during the preceding regime. The researchers who study 
the consolidation of democracy diverge as to the question whether it was the 
parliamentary system in Czech and Hungary that brought them success and 
due to which they became the most consolidated democracies in CEE, or these 
countries chose the parliamentary system because of the powerful positions 
occupied by the democratic elites. Though there are some contradictions 
as to the first postulate. The example of Slovakia, which, being without 
Czechoslovakia, would have chosen the presidential system, shows that the 
parliamentary system does not protect from the president’s ambitions as it was 
in the case of V. Mečiar.10
T. Baylis believes, that during the first years of the system change, the 
crucial negative role in nearly all eastern European countries was played 
by the conflicts between the president and the prime minister.11 Even in 
purely parliamentary systems one could observe such phenomena and the 
destructive potential of these conflicts was not always lower than in semi-
presidential systems. The conflict between president А. Göncz and prime-
minister P. Antall could have damaged Hungarian democracy even more, but 
for the death of the latter at the end of 1993. In Slovakia the conflict between 
V. Mečiar and M. Kováč to the less degree was determined by the formal 
powers, than by simple authoritative resources, and this rather negatively 
influenced the development of democratic institutions. Apparently, because 
of this P. Shaki, deputy minister for civil rights and ethnic minorities’ rights, 
who in 1998 replaced V. Mečiar’s government, stated after the elections that 
“today we deal with the government formation, and tomorrow we will start 
changing the regime”.12
10 N. LAZAR, Dilemmas of Post-communist Transformations: Slovakia’s Experience, in: 
Political Science and Sociological Sciences’ Workshop, Collection of Scientific Works, Vol. 
ІІ, Chernivtsi 2002, pp. 226–227.
11 T. BAYLIS, Presidents, Versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern 
Europe, in: World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 3, 1997, p. 302.
12 Volby i stat. Pal śaki, in: Pravda, October 21, 1998.
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The choice of the form of the government has influence on the structure 
of the party system. The more presidential traits had the constitutional order 
in the country, the highest level of polarity it had. At the same time only the 
combination of some institutions had strong influence upon the party system. In 
particular, the general direct presidential elections with the majority electoral 
system (or with the system that leads to majority creation) had structured 
influence on the party system. As a rule it is influenced by other institutional 
factors like: the division of branches of government between federal and 
regional bodies or the constitutional court’s prerogative as a guarantor for the 
established order in the system of government.
M. Duverger, G. Sartori and A. Lijphart consider the electoral system to 
be the most powerful factor that determines the party system. In this respect 
the experience of the old regimes was crucial for the choice of the electoral 
system institutions. At the constituent assembly in 1990 in all CEE countries, 
the system of absolute majority dominated (this did not use to be the case during 
the 2nd (1945) and the 3rd (1947) waves of democratization in Europe). Up to 
1995 the system of absolute majority functioned in three countries (Belarus, 
Macedonia, Ukraine), where the change of authority did not take place. In 
four countries (Albania, Lithuania, Russia, Croatia) mixed and uncoordinated 
electoral system was used as a transitional variant on the way towards the 
system of proportional representation. Partly new elites (Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Croatia), and partly old elites (Albania, Yugoslavia) abolished the 
system of majority, immediately as it stopped serving their strategic plans 
of winning the elections. The strategies of saving the electoral systems of 
majority sometimes led old elites to loss of power instead of its retention.
Western Europe gained this experience during Gaullism period in 
France, and in Eastern Europe it was convincingly confirmed – the system of 
absolute majority, as showed the example of Ukraine, Belarus and Macedonia, 
did not contribute to the modern party systems. At the constituent assembly in 
Czechoslovakia dominated the proportional system, as the old communist elite 
was to capitulate and new leaders of transformation had already achieved the 
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victory at the previous elections.13 The differentiated threshold as an electoral 
barrier against the fragmentation of the party system was established both 
in the Czech Republic and in Hungary. In the Czech Republic remained the 
same rules as in Czechoslovakia (national barrier equaled 5%), and they were 
modified for the electoral blocks (block of two parties equaled 7%, block of 
three parties equaled 9%). In 1990 in Hungary the national barrier was 4%, 
and in 1994 it was raised up to 5% (for electoral blocks of two parties it was 
10%, for blocks of three parties it was 15%). 
Political Institutions as the Component of the Democracy Consolidation 
Phase
On the whole the creation of institutions is considered to be a part of the 
democracy consolidation phase.  But a number of researchers and W. Merkel 
in particular determine the institutionalization of democracy as an element 
of the second transitional phase.14 The postulate offered by S. Huntington 
which is vital for democracy consolidation says that holding of two free 
elections or carrying out the double change of power in accordance with 
the constitution cannot be considered as a satisfactory result nowadays.15 
The examples from the political history of Europe refute it. Thus, the 
change of the government in the FRG took place only in two decades. So, 
it means, that up to that time, according to Huntington, German postwar 
democracy cannot be considered as a consolidated one. Another example is 
consolidated democracy in Italy, where there was no change of actual power 
until 1994. Apparently, that after the successful consolidation of democracy, 
the researchers of the transformational process can discover a new sphere 
of analysis, which at first sight sounds a bit strange, but correct, namely the 
change from “democracy to democracy”.
13 HUNTINGTON, The Third Wave, p. 28.
14 W. MERKEL, Theorien der Transformation: Die demokratische Konsolidierung postau-
toritärer Gesellschaften, in: K. VON BEYME – C. OFFE (Hrsg.), Politische Theorien in 
der Ära der Transformation, Opladen 1996, p. 41.
15 HUNTINGTON, The Third Wave, p. 267.
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The post-communist societies of CEE worked out a great number of 
mixed forms of the legal state and various types of anomalies. Thus, the 
change of the government took place in Albania, but the elections, next after 
the constituent ones, were considered by the opposition as unfair. A unique 
event happened in Slovakia, when the government of the former communists 
fell from power at the elections, but came to it at the next elections. So, 
there was a change of the governments in the countries, but no one considers 
these states to be consolidated democracies. Albania is not in the focus of 
European politics yet due to its peripheral location. And Slovakia took great 
efforts and together with the Czech Republic became the member of the EU. 
The economic indices were of crucial importance in this process, as the EU, 
despite the political rhetoric put economic cooperation in the first place.
Political Scientists’ Discussions concerning the Criteria and Conditions 
for Consolidation
Analyzing consolidation, minimalists usually use formal criteria consisting 
of seven indicators of polyarchy proposed by R. Dahl, which are determined 
by the rules of law and institutions; and G. O’Donnell’s approaches.16 
Maximalists, in their turn, believe democracy to be more than a political 
regime and to combine several spheres, namely free and life-giving society, 
the availability of civil society, bureaucracy which would be loyal to 
democracy and institutionalized economic society.17 Sticking to this theory, it 
should be mentioned that most of eastern European political transformational 
regimes do not correspond to the consolidation criteria. At the same time, in 
scientific publications concerning modernization there is a fixed threshold 
for successful democratization due to the execution of a number of vital 
preconditions, which are necessary for democratization attempts to succeed. 
16 R. A. DAHL, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven 1971, p. 257; G. 
O’DONNELL, Illusions about “Consolidation”, in: Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, 
1996, p. 35.
17 J. LINZ – A. STEPAN, Towards Consolidated Democracies, in: Journal of Democracy, Vol. 
7, No. 2, 1996, p. 17.
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Most of them can be used for analysis, a phase of democratization and a 
phase of consolidation.
The first quite spread precondition is the effectively functioning market 
economy with minimal prosperity. It (the precondition) was introduced in 1990 
by J. Linz and A. Stepan as a notion of “economic society”.18 In this respect the 
post-communist societies look even more injured than the post-fascist ones. 
Fascism created economy under the aegis of the state, but it did not make 
encroachments on private property. Spain, with its powerful authoritarian 
tendencies in the time of fascism, at the end of Franko’s governing came to an 
open economy. But other forms of state property and interference are known. 
They coexisted with democracy until the state interference led to the economic 
stagnation and democracy oppression.
At the beginning of the 90s of the 20th century, researches were seized 
by the east European changes. F. Schmitter and others refuted economically 
determined “teaching about the preconditions”. Cause and effect relationship 
acquired reversed character: democracy appeared to be stylized to the 
precondition of the successful market economy, and as the assumption was not 
absolutely convincing, it was strengthened by the structures of the international 
support: only democratic regimes have an outlook for receiving western help 
and joining the EU and NATO. But it was quickly clarified that there was no 
Marshall plan for CEE and actual aid was rather modest. K. von Beyme believes 
that perceptual pattern of international help within CEE is just catastrophic.19
The CEE citizens rapidly understood that they should not rely on 
the West’s help. The Hungarian ambassador to Romania declared that any 
country could remain democratic if its GDP is more than $6000 per capita. 
He highlighted that Hungary could rapidly become democratic, whereas 
Romania would stay in its transitional period for a long time. Those words 
were confirmed by A. Przeworski, who concluded that the democratic system 
18 Ibidem, p. 21.
19 Von BEYME, p. 153.
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“with more than $6000 per capita must stay alive”.20 His evidence is allayed 
by H. Linz’s thesis, who mentions that the parliamentary systems even in poor 
nations are more probably to survive, than the presidential systems.
At the same time the changes of transitional character, which depict the 
context of the political system, are possible here. Taking into an account the 
indicator of the GDP per capita at the beginning of transformation, we can see 
that only the Czech Republic ($7,424), Slovenia ($6,540) and Hungary ($5,330) 
had prospects of quick consolidation. Bulgaria ($5,113) and Poland (4,086) were 
in tolerance limits. The GDP of other countries was less than $3,000. But if one 
compares these indices with analogic ones of the consolidated democracies of 
the third wave, then it can be seen that the GDP per capita in Spain was $4,159, 
in Greece it was $3,224, in Portugal it was $2,397.21 The calculations were 
made by A. Przeworski, who had previously been against the generalization of 
modernization theories and dependence of democracy on economics, as they had 
not been corroborated in Spain.22 This approach can be correct, but only because 
it was applied to “all countries without exceptions”. S. Huntington’s thesis that 
democracy can exist only in the place where there is the USA’s influence or 
legacy of European colonialism, appears to be no less than problematic, though 
the political factors of international influence are taken into consideration.
Let’s consider another condition for democracy consolidation, namely 
“bureaucracy’s loyalty”.23 This factor has wide tendencies. The post-fascist 
countries “cleared” their bureaucracy just a little. Their loyalty was not 
checked, except for the Spanish attempt of coup in 1981. In Italy from time to 
time there was a great deal of talk about exposing the pro-fascist conspiracies 
among the high elite circles, but though there were no loyalty checks in the 
country. Only in Hungary 80% of elite was changed.
20 A. PRZEWORSKI, Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reform in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America, Cambridge 1991, p. 49.
21 M. G. SCHMIDT, Political Performance and Types of Democracy: Findings from Compar-
ative Sstudies, in: European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 41, 2002, p. 153.
22 PRZEWORSKI, p. 96.
23 SCHMIDT, p. 152.
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Student movements in many countries in the 60s of the 20th century stood 
up for disclosure of former elites’ suppression. In literature these questions 
are rarely raised, with the exception of S. Huntington, who implored not to 
persecute the adherents of dictatorship when the system was changed, as in 
this case “political losses exceed moral benefits”.24
Despite the numerous crimes and human rights limitations, real socialism 
should not be referred to criminal regime. Only in the Czech Republic the legislative 
act of prosecution of regime criminals was adopted. However, the Law on Lustration 
in 1991 led to dismissal of many functionaries, even such figure as A. Dubček had 
to be dismissed. Later, while heading the parliament he refused to sign the law. This 
cruel law was classified as the alibi law. It specified the criteria of incompatibility 
with the positions under authoritarian and democratic regimes, not to investigate 
every separate case. Thus, after 1990 in the FRG the responsibility was placed 
on bureaucracy of Hauk’s department, regardless of high political losses, as it did 
not concern the ruling elite of the country. The results of democracy consolidation 
hugely depend on the way the functional bureaucracy implement the newly created 
parliaments’ and governments’ decisions. As a rule no one can demand more 
diligence from bureaucracy, which have not been dismissed up to the middle level 
and have been reconstructing clans and high-ranking functionaries’ traditions up to 
this time, and as a result slowing down consolidation of democracy due to their 
passive resistance. Only the state, where the multi-party system exists and functions, 
can contribute to the gradual change of the administrative elites and this minimalizes 
the threat of destabilization. An amount of old functionaries who quit from the organs 
of government is less than the number of new members of administrative staff 
from the party which wins the elections. At the same time a normal alternation of 
generations happens. That is why we believe that consolidation of new democracies 
is a question of time.
So, the processes of new democracies formation and consolidation in the 
CEE countries, which have started after the revolutions of 1989, are complicated 
and disputable. The post-communist period shows the differences in economic, 
24 HUNTINGTON, The Third Wave, p. 231.
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political and social structures, despite the similar influence of the communist system. 
In all countries party systems differ from the West analogic democratic structures, 
they just being of slight resemblance. They also differ from the systems where 
democratic principles have not been formed yet. Progressive economic reforms 
of the government have caused decline in living standards. All this influenced the 
processes of democracy consolidation, which have not taken place in many countries.
To our mind, the study of the preconditions for democracy consolidation 
in the context of analysis of the transitional post-communist societies in CEE, 
proves that the countries, which managed to pass the democratization phase 
rather quickly (till the adoption of the constitution), and during the consolidation 
phase partly resolved three institutional preconditions, have achieved greater success 
in their development. These institutional preconditions, namely strengthening of 
the national borders, choosing the form of the government and the electoral system, 
played an important role in stabilization of countries and societies. In general, these 
institutional changes became the crucial factors of consolidation, which, in its turn, 
became the guarantor of the CEE countries’ success recognition in the world.
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The author of the paper studies consolidation of democracy in the CEE 
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